

WARP XII

PATTERNS OF CONFLICT

2 February 1978

John R. Byrd

OUTLINE

- BACKGROUND
- HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION
- SYNTHESIS

PURPOSE

- To discern a Pattern for Successful Operations
- To help generalize Tactics and Strategy
- To find a basis for Grand Strategy

BACKGROUND

AIR-to-AIR

GENERALIZATION

- Need fighter that can both lose energy and gain energy more quickly while outturning an adversary.
- Suggests a fighter with a higher aerodynamic G and higher turn rate/lower turn radii for positive energy rates -- but not necessarily higher turn rates/lower turn radii for negative energy rates.
- In other words, suggests a fighter that can be used to initiate and control engagement opportunities -- yet has a fast transient ("natural hook") that can be used to either force an overshoot by an attacker or stay inside a hard turning defender.

IDEA EXPANSION

- Idea of fast transients suggests that, in order to win we should operate at a faster tempo than our adversaries -- or better yet, get inside adversary's Observation-Decision-Action time scales.
- Why? Such activity will make us appear ambiguous (unpredictable) thereby generate confusion and disorder among our adversaries -- since our adversaries can only perceive an opponent's image that does not match the real (fast transient) opponent they are competing against.

EXAMPLES

- Blitzkrieg vs Maginot Line Mentality (1940)
- F-86 vs MiG-15 (1951 - 53)
- Israeli Raid (1976)

NEW CONCEPTION

- ACTION: Exploit operations and weapons that:
 - Generate a rapidly changing environment (quick/clear observations and decisions, fast tempo, fast transient maneuvers, quick kill),
 - Inhibit an adversary's capacity to adapt to such an environment (cloud or distort his observations and decisions)
- GOAL: Collapse adversary's system into confusion and disorder by causing him to over and under react to activity that appears ambiguous, chaotic or misleading.

A-to-A and A-to-G

RECIPE FOR GENERATING CONFUSION AND DISORDER

- Observations
 - Quick/Clear Scanning Sensors
 - Suppressed/distorted signatures
- Activity
 - Quick and precise performance
 - Supercruise
 - Rapid energy gain and rapid energy loss coupled with hi turn rates and lo turn radii
 - Hi pitch rates/Hi roll rates/Hi yaw rates coupled with ease of control
 - Kill Mechanism
 - Quick shoot weapons and fire control systems

HISTORICAL INVESTIGATION

SOURCES

- Bayerlein, Fritz "With the Panzers in Russia 1941 & 43", Marine Corps Gazette, December 1954
- Brown, Anthony Cave "Bodyguard of Lies" 1975
- Canby, Steven "The Alliance and Europe: Part IV Military Doctrine and Technology" Adelphi Paper No. 109, Winter 1974/75
- Clausewitz, Carl Von "On War" (translated by M. Howard and P. Paret, 1976) 1832
- Despres, John; Dzirkals, Lilita; Whaley, Barton "Timely Lessons from History: The Manchurian Model for Soviet Strategy"
- Downing, David "The Devil's Virtuoso: German Generals at War 1940-45", 1977
- Dupuy, T.N. "A Genius for War", 1977
- Dzirkals, Lilita F. "Lightning War in Manchuria: Soviet Military Analysis of the 1945 Far East Campaign", July 1975
- Fuller, J. F. C. "The Conduct of War, 1789-1961", 1961
- Guderian, Heinz "Panzer Leader", 1952
- Guevara, Che "Guerrilla Warfare", 1961
- Handel, Michael I. "The Yom Kippur War and the Inevitability of Surprise", International Studies Quarterly, September 1977
- Humble, Richard "Hitler's Generals" 1974
- Irving, David "The Trail of the Fox", 1977
- Isby, David C. "Modern Infantry Tactics, 1914-74" Strategy and Tactics, Sept/Oct 1974
- Keegan, John "The Face of Battle", 1977
- Kesselring, Albert, et al "Manual for Command and Combat Employment of Smaller Units" (Based on German Experiences in World War II), 1952
- Laqueur, Walter "Guerrilla", 1976
- Laqueur, Walter (editor) "The Guerrilla Reader", 1977
- Lawrence, T.E. "Seven Pillars of Wisdom", 1935
- Liddell Hart, B.H. "The Ghost of Napoleon", 1934
- Liddell Hart, B.H. "Strategy", 1967
- Liddell Hart, B.H. "History of the Second World War" (two volumes), 1970

- Macksey, Kenneth "Panzer Division", 1968
- Macksey, Kenneth "Guderian: Creator of the Blitzkrieg", 1976
- Manstein, Erich Von "Lost Victories", 1958
- Mao Tse-Tung "On Guerrilla Warfare", (translated by S. B. Griffith, 1961), 1937
- Mellenthin, F. W. Von "Panzer Battles", 1956
- Messenger, Charles "The Blitzkrieg Story", 1976
- Miksche, F. O. "Blitzkrieg", 1941
- Miksche, F. O. "Atomic Weapons & Armies", 1955
- Montross, Lynn "War Through the Ages", 1960
- Morris, Eric, Johnson, Curt; Chant, Christopher; Wilmott, H. P. "Weapons and Warfare of the 20th Century", 1976
- Patrick, Stephen B. "Combined Arms Combat Operations in the 20th Century" Strategy and Tactics, Sept/Oct 1974
- Pustay, John S. "Counterinsurgency Warfare", 1965
- Savkin, V. YE. "The Basic Principles of Operational Art and Tactics" (A Soviet View), 1972
- Sidorenko, A. A. "The Offensive" (A Soviet View), 1970
- Singh, Baljit & Mei, Ko-Wang "Modern Guerrilla Warfare", 1971
- Sun Tzu "The Art of War" (translated by S. B. Griffith, 1971) around 400 B.C.
- Thayer, Charles W. "Guerrilla", 1961
- Thompson, R. W. "D-Day", 1968
- Wernick, Robert (and the editors of Time-Life Books) "Blitzkrieg", 1976
- Whiting, Charles "Patton", 1970
- Winterbotham, F. W. "The Ultra Secret", 1975
- Army FM 100-5 "Operations", July 1976
- Encyclopedia Britannica, 1972

GOAL

- Improve our capacity for independent action

This may mean we need to

- Deprive our adversary of his capacity for independent action.

QUESTIONS

- How do we realize such a goal by waging war?
- Does history give any insight or suggest any useful pattern?

HISTORICAL PATTERN

SUN TZU -- "THE ART OF WAR" -- AROUND 400 BC

THEME

- Deception
- Swiftess-of Action
- Fluidity-of-Action
- Cohesion
- Dispersion/Concentration
- Surprise
- Shock

STRATEGY

- Probe enemy's organization and dispositions to learn his strengths and weaknesses and unmask intentions.
- "Shape" enemy's perception of world to manipulate his plans and actions.
- Attack enemy's plans as best policy. Next best disrupt his alliances. Next best attack his army. Attack cities only when there is no alternative.
- Employ Cheng and Ch'i maneuvers to unexpectedly and quickly hurl strength against weakness.

DESIRED OUTCOME

- Subdue enemy without fighting
- Avoid protracted war

HISTORICAL PATTERN

Early Commanders

- Alexander
- Hannibal
- Belisarius
- Jenghis Khan
- Tamerlane


Impression

- Early Commanders seem consistent with ideas of Sun Tzu
- Western Commanders more directly concerned with winning the battle
- Eastern Commanders closer to Sun Tzu in attempting to shatter adversary prior to battle


Action

Cheng and Ch'i

BATTLE OF CANNAE



MONGOL INVASION



500 MILES

•HERAT

HISTORICAL PATTERN

18th Century Theoreticians

- Saxe
- Bourcet
- Guibert
- Du Teil

Theme

- Mobility/fluidity of force
- Cohesion
- Dispersion and concentration
- Plan with several branches
- Operate on a line to threaten alternative objectives
- Concentrate direct artillery fire on key points to be forced

Action

- Napoleon was deeply influenced by the ideas of the above men. In early campaigns (as a general) he applied these ideas as the basis for deception and surprise to defeat superior forces. In later campaigns (as emperor) he relied increasingly on pure offensive power in the form of dense infantry columns, massed direct artillery fire, and heavy cavalry going against regions of strong resistance -- at an eventually crippling cost in casualties.
- American Colonists, Spanish and Russian Guerrillas, in unexpected ways, used environmental background (terrain, weather, darkness, etc.) and mobility/fluidity as basis for dispersion and concentration to harass, confuse, and contribute toward the defeat of the British and French under Napoleon.

IMPRESSION

The ideas of Sun Tzu, Saxe, Bourcet, and Guibert seem to be at home with either Regular or Guerrilla Warfare.

HISTORICAL PATTERN


CARL VON CLAUSEWITZ -- "ON WAR" -- 1832

Overemphasis

Decisive Battle

Underemphasis

Strategic Maneuver



Why?

Clausewitz was concerned with trying to overcome friction/uncertainty and failed to address the idea of magnifying adversary friction/uncertainty.

HISTORICAL PATTERN

19th Century Technology

- Railroad/Telegraph
- Quick Fire Artillery
- Machine Gun
- Repeating Rifle
- Barbed Wire
- Trenches

Early Trends

- Emphasized massed firepower and rail logistics to support it
- Increased emphasis on a holding defense and flanking maneuvers on a broad front to gain a decision
- Use of frontal assaults by infantry supported by artillery barrages against regions of strong resistance

Result

- Huge armies, and massed firepower and other vast needs supported through a narrow fixed logistics network suppressed deception, surprise and mobility of any operation.

KEY POINTS

- The massing of enormous supplies through a narrow logistics network -- coupled with the influence of a Clausewitzian battle philosophy -- "telegraphed" any punch hence minimized the possibility of deception, surprise and mobility to gain a decisive edge.

- In this sense, technology was being used as a crude club that generated frightful and debilitating casualties on all sides during the:
 - American Civil War (1861-65)
 - Austro-Prussian War (1866)
 - Franco-Prussian War (1870)
 - Boer War (1899-1902)
 - Russo-Japanese War (1904-05)
 - World War I (1914-18)

WORLD WAR I

- PLANS AND EXECUTION
- STAGNATION
- FINALE

WORLD WAR I

Action

- Offensives conducted on wide fronts
- Eveness of advance maintained to protect flanks and provide artillery support as advance makes headway
- Reserves thrown in whenever attack held up -- against regions or points of strong resistance

Reaction

- Defense organized into depth of successive belts of fortified terrain
- Massed artillery and machinegun fire designed to arrest and pin down attacker
- Counter-attack to win back lost ground

Result

- Stagnation and enormous attrition since advances made generally as expected along paths of hardened resistance because of dependence upon railroads and choice of tactics of trying to reduce strong points by massed infantry and firepower.

WORLD WAR I

A WAY OUT

Idea

- Infiltration Tactics
- Guerrilla Tactics

Authors

- Capt Laffargue
- Gen Von Hutier?
- Gen Ludendorff
- T.E. Lawrence
- Paul Von Lettow-Vorbeck

WORLD WAR I

Infiltration Tactics

Action

- Brief but intense artillery bombardment to disrupt/suppress defenses and obscure the assault.
- Assault by constantly reinforced special teams (stormtroopers) trained for cohesion and equipped with grenades, light machine guns, and light mortars with orders to avoid opposition and pour (infiltrate) into any gaps they could find or create.
- Follow-up teams of infantry, machine gunners, mortars, field engineers and artillery observers move-in to mop-up isolated centers of resistance.
- Reserves are fed through gaps from the rear to enlarge gaps and breaches along paths of least resistance and consolidate gains against counter-attack. In this way reserves are employed to support success instead of trying to redeem failure against regions of heavy resistance.

Idea

- Achieve a tactical breakthrough in order to gain the opportunity to apply the strongest form of attack: envelopment.

WORLD WAR I
Infiltration Tactics

- Result
 - Immediate success at platoon/company/battalion level coupled with ultimate failure at corps/army level.
- Why?
 - Ludendorff violated his own concept by his tendency to use strategic reserves to reinforce against hardened resistance -- hence at the strategic level, he seduced himself into supporting failure not success.
 - Exhaustion of combat teams leading the assault.
 - Logistics too inflexible to support rapid/fluid penetration and deeper exploitation of breakthrough.
 - Communications too immobile to allow command to quickly identify and reinforce successful advances.
 - Elastic Defense (when used) as developed by the Germans and practiced by Petain.

WORLD WAR I

Guerrilla Warfare (a la T. E. Lawrence)

Action

- Gain support of population. Must "arrange the minds" of friend, foe and neutral alike. Must "get inside their minds".
- Must "be an idea or thing invulnerable, without front or back, drifting about like a gas" (inconspicuousness and fluidity-of-action). Must be an "attack-in-depth".
- Tactics "should be tip-and-run, not pushes but strokes" with "use of the smallest force in the quickest time at the farthest place".
- Should be a war of detachment (avoiding contact and presenting a threat everywhere) using mobility/fluidity-of-action and environmental background (vast unknown desert) as basis for "never affording a target" and "never on the defensive except by accident and in error".

Idea

- Disintegrate existing regime's ability to govern.

IMPRESSION

- Infiltration tactics a la Ludendorff seem to be similar in nature to Irregular or Guerrilla tactics a la Lawrence.
- Why? Both use fluidity-of-action and cohesion of small units to concentrate strength against weakness -- but at different levels of concentration.

MAJOR ADVANCES
BETWEEN WORLD WAR I AND II

LIGHTNING WAR (BLITZKRIEG)

- Infiltration Tactics of 1918 were mated with:
 - Tank
 - Motorized Artillery
 - Tactical Aircraft
 - Motor Transport
 - Better Communicationsby
 - JFC Fuller
 - Heinz Guderian
- Result:
 - Blitzkrieg to generate a breakthrough by piercing a region about 1-2 kilometers wide at two or three points on a narrow front with armor, motorized infantry, and follow-up infantry divisions supported by tactical aircraft.

GUERRILLA WAR

- Guerrilla Strategy and Tactics were codified by Mao Tse-Tung.
- Result:
 - Modern Guerrilla Warfare has become an overall political, economic, psychological and military framework for "total war".

BLITZKRIEG AND GUERRILLA STRATEGY

Infiltration

- Blitz and Guerrillas infiltrate a nation or regime at all levels to soften and shatter the moral fiber of the political, economic and social structure. To carry out this program, a la Sun Tzu, Blitz and Guerrillas:
 - Probe and test to unmask strengths, weaknesses and intentions.
 - Shape adversary's perception of the world to manipulate or undermine his plans and actions.

Purpose

- To force capitulation when combined with external political, economic, and military pressures.

or

- To minimize the resistance of a weakened foe for the military blows that will follow.

WORLD WAR II
Blitzkrieg

Action

- Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground), and patrol actions probe and test adversary before and during combat operations to uncover strengths, weaknesses, and intentions.
- Schwerpunkt (point of main effort) established before and shifted during combat operations to bypass adversary strength and strike at weakness. Points of other effort employed to tie-up or drain-away adversary strength.
- Sudden/intense but brief (or possibly no) preliminary bombardment by artillery and/or air to disrupt/suppress defenders and obscure the advance.
- Armored reconnaissance or stormtrooper teams, leading armored columns, advance rapidly from least expected regions to infiltrate adversary on a narrow front to find paths of least resistance.
- Armored assault teams of tanks, infantry, combat engineers, anti-tank/assault guns, and other specialists, together with close artillery and air support, quickly open breaches and gaps along paths of least resistance uncovered by armored reconnaissance or stormtroopers.
- When breakthrough occurs, relatively independent mobile/armored teams led by armored reconnaissance, with air support (recce, fire, and airlift when necessary), blow-through to penetrate at high speed deep into adversary's rear along paths of least resistance. Object is to cut lines of communication, paralyze command and envelop adversary forces and resources.
- Motorized or foot infantry further back supported by artillery and armor pour-in to wipe-out isolated pockets of resistance, enlarge the breaches and secure the encirclement or captured terrain against possible counter-attack.

Idea


- Conquer an entire region in the quickest possible time by using initial surprise coupled with fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of armored teams as basis for quick concentration and shifting of attack and follow-on echelons against an adversary's communication, command, and support structure in order to confuse, disorder, and finally shatter his will or capacity to resist.

UNIFYING CONCEPT OF BLITZKRIEG


Schwerpunkt (Point of Main Effort)

- Implies a thinning out of force and effort in other sectors.
- Center or axis around which:
 - Fire and movement of all arms (at all levels) are focused to produce sudden shock action.
 - Initiative at tactical level is meshed with intent at strategic level.
- Unifying concept or tool that makes possible true decentralization of tactical command within centralized strategic guidance.


IMPRESSION OF THE BLITZKRIEG PENETRATION




Impression of the Lincer (Envelopment)



Typical Impression of Blitzkrieg Envelopment



Creation of the Blitzkrieg



WORLD WAR II

Blitzkrieg

Key to Success

- Intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and stratagem emphasized before and during combat operations to unmask and shape patterns of adversary strengths, weaknesses and intentions.
- Initial surprise coupled with fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of armored teams, with air support, to permit repeated and rapidly shifting concentration of strength against weakness thereby generate doubt and uncertainty which magnify into panic and chaos.
- Decentralized command -- based on "schwerpunkt" -- with wide freedom for lower level combat leaders (forward) to exploit opportunities generated by rapid action within a broad loosely woven scheme laid down from central command.
- Superior mobile communications to maintain cohesion of overall effort and to enable higher command levels to allocate reserves and support and to shift point of main effort.
- Essential and only essential logistics tail (using airlift when appropriate and necessary) to support high speed movement and rapid shift among routes of advance.

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

Action

- Capitalize on corruption (real or imagined), incompetence and unwanted presence of existing regime to organize and maintain mass popular support through a militant political program.
- Set-up administrative and military organization, sanctuary and communications network under the control of the guerrilla political leadership without arousing regime's intelligence and security apparatus.
- Probe and test, by infiltration of regime political/military organization, to uncover strengths, weaknesses and intentions.
- Disrupt the political/economic/social structure by fomenting civil disorders (such as rallies, demonstrations, strikes and riots), by selected terrorism and by the use of sabotage to demonstrate and magnify (by propaganda) the presence of corruption and the inability of regime to govern.
- Employ tiny cohesive bands for surprise hit-and-run raids against lines of communications (to gain arms and supplies) but retreat and melt into environment when faced by superior police and armed forces.
- Employ methods to expand guerrilla influence/control over inhabitants and countryside as basis to gain more recruits, expand base areas and erode government influence. (e.g., encourage government to indiscriminantly take harsh anti-population reprisal measures, magnify grievances of population and play upon their obsessions by propaganda and "re-education". ...)
- Harass ever larger government concentrations (in front, flank, and rear) with ever larger bands by sudden ambush against supply columns and patrols and by infiltration or sneak attack against isolated detachments. Disperse to avoid open combat or a major assault by superior forces.
- Demonstrate disintegration of regime by carefully selected attack against major force units using methods of conventional warfare.

Idea

- Defeat existing regime by politically challenging the right and ability to govern and militarily by continuously using stealth/fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of small bands as basis for concentration, dispersion and shifting of forces to harass, confuse and ultimately destroy his will or capacity to resist.

MODERN GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

KEY TO SUCCESS

- Ability to continuously demonstrate government weakness, erode government influence, and alienate government from population.
- Environmental background and use of stealth/fast tempo/fluidity-of-action coupled with cohesion of tiny bands as basis for repeated concentration against weakness, dispersion to avoid adversary strength and shifting of effort to keep initiative.
- Support of population (both psychological and physical) that willingly furnishes recruits, intelligence, transportation, shelter, refuge, food, money and medical aid.
- Sanctuary (or base) as safe area to which guerrillas "can retire voluntarily or involuntarily, for rest, recuperation, repair of arms, clothing, and equipment, and where recruits can be indoctrinated, trained and equipped."

BLITZ/GUERRILLA THEME

Essence

- Initial surprise and shock followed by surprise and shock again, again, again, ...
- Avoid battles -- instead disrupt the connections and centers that provide cohesion (communications, lines of communication, command and supply centers, ...)
- Roll-up the isolated units/remnants created by the surprise, shock and disruption.

Intent

- Shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about adversary collapse -- by generating confusion, disorder and panic.

DISRUPT THE CONNECTIONS AND CENTERS THAT PROVIDE COHESION

Israeli example (a la Gen. Y. Yadin - 1949)

"To exploit the principles of war for our purpose and base ourselves upon strategic indirect approach, so as to determine the issue of the fighting even before fighting has begun, it is necessary to achieve the three following aims:

- (a) to cut the enemy's lines of communications, thus paralysing his physical build-up;
- (b) to seal him off from his lines of retreat thus undermining the enemy's will and destroying his morale;
- (c) to hit his centers of administration and disrupt his communications thus severing the link between his brain and limbs."

BLITZ RESULTS

Successful

- Poland 1939
- France 1940
- Balkans 1941
- Russia 1941
- North Africa 1941-42
- Russia Summer 1942
- Russia Feb-March 1943
- Advance Thru France 1944
- Manchuria 1945
- Middle East 1967
- Middle East 1973

Unsuccessful

- Russia Winter 1941-42
- Russia Fall, Winter 1942-43
- North Africa 1942
- Russia Summer 1943
- Ardennes Winter 1944-45

GUERRILLA RESULTS

Successful

- American Colonies 1775-81
- Spain 1808-14
- Russia 1812
- German East Africa 1914-18
- Arabia 1916-18
- China 1927-49
- Russia 1941-45
- Yugoslavia 1941-45
- Indochina 1945-54
- Algeria 1954-62
- Cuba 1956-59
- South Vietnam 1958-75

Unsuccessful

- Philippines 1899-1902
- South Africa 1900-02
- Greece 1944-49
- Philippines* 1946-54
- Malaya* 1948-60

* Regime exercised particular care not to inflict casualties and to protect population.

? KEY QUESTION ?

- Why have Blitz and Guerrilla tactics been so extraordinarily successful?

FUNDAMENTAL MESSAGE

Action

- Blitz and Guerrillas repeatedly and unexpectedly hurl strength against weakness by being able to move and shift more quickly and to concentrate or disperse more quickly from or to lower levels of distinction (organizational and environmental) without losing cohesion of overall effort.
- Put another way, Blitz and Guerrillas "get inside adversary's" Observation-Decision-Action or Mind-Time-Space framework.


Result

- Such activity by Blitz and Guerrillas make them appear ambiguous (unpredictable) and awesome which magnifies into confusion, disorder and panic (among their adverseries) to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse -- a notion implied by Sun Tzu around 400 BC and more recently recognized by J.F.C. Fuller after observing the impact of Ludendorff's infiltration tactics in 1918.

NATURAL QUESTIONS?

- How can we defend against or counter the Blitz?
- How can we defend against or counter the Guerrilla Movement?

"Where are the Weaknesses
of the Blity?"



KEY POINT

Difficult to sustain fast tempo and maintain cohesion of Blitz effort when forced to repeatedly and rapidly shift concentration of strength against weakness.

COUNTER-BLITZ

(Variation of German Experiences During WWII)

Posture

- Emphasize intelligence, reconnaissance (air and ground) and set-up screen of forward outposts and patrols to report on adversary activity and warn of any impending or actual incursions.
- Deploy and disperse reconnaissance and mobile anti-tank infantry/armored teams together with artillery in region behind screen so that they can inconspicuously/quickly move laterally and forward in a coordinated effort to confront or coagulate against any adversary thrust(s).
- Place armored teams, as mobile reserve, in echelon behind recce, anti-tank infantry/armor and artillery so that they can easily concentrate, and quickly move-in to decapitate any local breakthrough -- or push-off for a Blitz counterstroke.

Action

- Employ air and fast moving mobile/armored reconnaissance teams to determine direction/strength of thrust(s) and to continuously harass by repeated delaying actions and hit-and-run attacks in order to erode cohesion and slow momentum of Blitz attack.
- Inconspicuously move-in with high speed mobile anti-tank infantry/armored teams, together with air and artillery support, to stiffen favorable defense positions and combine the ambush with repeated sudden/sharp (but short) flank counter-attacks to channel as well as break-up cohesion of thrust(s) and drain away momentum of Blitz offensive.
- Concentrate swift armored combat forces (held in reserve) and use with air to rapidly drive a shallow and/or deep flank counterstroke in order to envelop and roll-up Blitz offensive in detail (counterstroke launched while adversary is moving forward).

Idea

- Smash Blitz offensive by inconspicuously using fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of counter-Blitz combat teams as basis for shifting of forces and quick concentration of effort to shatter Blitz cohesion and finally envelop it in order to destroy adversary's capacity to resist.

NOTE

Counter-Blitz imposes a greater stress than Blitz upon the cohesion of friendly combat teams -- since Counter-Blitzers must be able to react more inconspicuously and quicker than Blitz counterparts.

WHERE IS THE WEAKNESS OF GUERRILLA EFFORT?

Guerrillas need cause and support of population that is dependent upon regime's corruption and incompetence.

COUNTER-GUERRILLA CAMPAIGN

(a la Mikhail Tukhachevsky and Ramon Magsaysay)

Action

- Undermine guerrilla cause and destroy their cohesion by demonstrating integrity and competence of government to represent and serve needs of people -- rather than exploit and impoverish them for the benefit of a greedy elite.*
- Take political initiative to root out and visibly punish corruption. Select new leaders with recognized competence as well as popular appeal. Ensure that they deliver justice, eliminate grievances and connect government with grass roots.*
- Infiltrate guerrilla movement as well as employ population for intelligence about guerrilla plans, operations and organization.
- Deploy administrative talent, police, and roving counter-guerrilla teams into affected regions to inhibit guerrilla communication, coordination and movement as well as minimize their contact with local inhabitants.
- Take and keep initiative by relentless pursuit. Employ (guerrillas' own) tactics of infiltration, surprise hit-and-run, and sudden ambush to keep roving bands off-balance and to make base areas untenable.
- Emphasize capture and conversion to government cause -- instead of harsh anti-population reprisal measures and "body count" -- as basis to undermine guerrilla influence.
- Visibly identify central government with local political/economic/social reform in order to connect government with hopes and needs of people, thereby gain their support and confirm government legitimacy.

Idea

- Destroy guerrilla cohesion and break their hold upon the population via political initiative that demonstrates moral legitimacy and vitality of government and by relentless military operations that emphasize stealth/fast tempo/fluidity-of-action and cohesion of overall effort.

* If you cannot realize such a political program, you might consider changing sides!

CURRENT EXAMPLE

Recognition of Problem

Excerpt from Parade Magazine (8 May 77)

...No more ostentatious displays of wealth in South Korea -- that's the latest word from President Park Chung Hee.

Park is a noted champion of capitalism, but he is wise enough to know that vulgar displays of wealth emphasize the tremendous gap between the rich and poor of his country and thereby breed resentment.

He has therefore issued an order banning the wealthy from building large residences. Those who already occupy such mansions will move into more modest buildings.

Also in effect are orders banning extravagant parties, funerals, weddings, and anniversary celebrations. "These affairs stimulate resentment," Park declares, "and hinder the promotion of national unity between all classes of people."

Dictator Park, a peasant's son, apparently was shocked by the ostentatious display of wealth when he recently toured Dongbingo, a wealthy suburb of Seoul. He saw private homes equipped with swimming pools, elevators, saunas, and the latest electronic gadgetry.

SYNTHESIS

PATTERN FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

- Goal
- Plan
- Action
- Support
- Command

PATTERN FOR SUCCESSFUL OPERATIONS

Goal

- Deprive adversary of his capacity for independent action.

Plan

- Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses and intentions.
 - Shape ambiguous posture with many branches
 - Shape adversary's perception of the world
- } to manipulate or undermine adversary's plans and actions.
- Select initiative (or response) that is least expected.
 - Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue direction that permits many branches and threatens alternative objectives.
 - Move along path of least resistance (to reinforce success).
 - Disrupt adversary's connections and centers that provide cohesion and permit coherent observation - orientation - decision - action loops.

Action

- Observe, orient, decide, and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more fluidity, without losing cohesion of overall effort, as basis to repeatedly and unexpectedly focus main effort against weakness, apply other effort to tie-up or drain-away adversary strength, and shift these efforts to keep or gain initiative.

Support

- Superior mobile communications
 - Only essential logistics
- } to maintain cohesion of overall effort and sustain appropriate pace of operations within available resources.

Command

- Decentralize, in a tactical sense, to encourage lower level commanders to shape, direct, and take the sudden/sharp actions necessary to quickly exploit opportunities as they present themselves.
- Centralize, in a strategic sense, to formulate policy, sketch flexible plans, allocate resources, and shift focus of overall effort.

IMPRESSIONS

- Plan and Action statements suggest that we are trying to:
 - Run-up the number of states
 - Shape arrangement of states
 - Fabricate and shift focus of these states
 - Compress time

- Intentions that make-up Plan cannot happen without application of transients that make-up Action.

FIRST IMPRESSION

- A synthesis of these Plan and Action statements suggests a rediscovery of the 18th Century or Napoleonic notion of Grand Tactics -- "tactical velocity mated with strategic deception".

or as we shall put it:

- Magnify the number, shape the arrangement, and fabricate the focus of environmental states (real and imagined, clear and obscure) that an adversary must consider, then shift the focus and compress the time within which he must act to cope with, or adapt to, these hostile states.

SECOND IMPRESSION

Transients

- Observe, Orient, Decide and Act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more fluidity...

or put another way

- Get inside adversary's Observation-Orientation-Decision-Action or Mind-Time-Space

Permits one to

Intentions

- Probe and test adversary to unmask strengths, weaknesses, and intentions
- Manipulate or undermine adversary's plans and actions by
 - shaping ambiguous posture with many branches
 - shaping his perception of the world
- Select initiative (or response) that is least expected
- Establish focus of main effort together with other effort and pursue direction that permits many branches and threatens alternative objectives
- Move along path of least resistance (to reinforce success)
- Disrupt adversary's connections and centers that provide cohesion and permit coherent observation-orientation-decision-action loops.
- Focus main effort against weakness, apply other effort to tie-up or drain-away adversary strength and shift these efforts to keep or gain initiative.
- Generate uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos,... to shatter cohesion, produce paralysis and bring about collapse
- Become an extraordinary commander

NOW ALTOGETHER

Strategy

- Shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about adversary collapse by generating uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic chaos...

Grand Tactics

- Magnify the number, shape the arrangement, and fabricate the focus of environmental states (real and imagined, clear and obscure) that an adversary must consider, then shift the focus and compress the time within which he must act to cope with, or adapt to, these hostile states.

Tactics

- Observe, orient, decide, and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more fluidity, without losing cohesion of overall effort, as basis to repeatedly and unexpectedly focus main effort against weakness, apply other effort to tie-up or drain-away adversary strength, and shift these efforts to keep or gain initiative.

or put another way

- Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act inside adversary's Mind-Time-Space.

GRAND STRATEGY

Essence

- Shape pursuit of national goal so that potential adversaries realize some benefits and are empathetic toward our success.

Basis

- An appreciation for our underlying self-interests and our potential adversaries' obsessions.

PATTERN

National Goal

- Improve our capacity for independent action

Grand Strategy

- Shape pursuit of national goal so that potential adversaries realize some benefits and are empathetic toward our success

Strategic Aim

- Deprive adversary of his capacity for independent action

Strategy

- Shatter cohesion, produce paralysis, and bring about adversary collapse by generating uncertainty, confusion, disorder, panic, chaos....

Grand Tactics

- Magnify the number, shape the arrangement, and fabricate the focus of environmental states (real and imagined, clear and obscure) that an adversary must consider, then shift the focus and compress the time within which he must act to cope with, or adapt to, these hostile states.

Tactics

- Observe, orient, decide, and act more inconspicuously, more quickly, and with more fluidity, without losing cohesion of overall effort, as basis to repeatedly and unexpectedly focus main effort against weakness, apply other effort to tie-up or drain-away adversary strength, and shift these efforts to keep or gain initiative.

or put another way

- Observe, orient, decide and act inside adversary's mind-time-space.

NOTE

On one hand, the National Goal and Grand Strategy as expressed appear to be in disharmony with the Strategic Aim, Strategy, Grand Tactics, and Tactics notions that make-up the pattern. On the other hand, application of these latter four strategic and tactical notions permit real leadership to avoid high attrition, avoid widespread destruction, and gain a quick victory. This combined with shattered cohesion, paralysis, and rapid collapse demonstrated by the existing adversary regime make it appear corrupt, incompetent, and unfit to govern. Under these circumstances, leaders and statesmen offering generous terms can form the basis for a viable peace. In this sense, the first two and the latter four notions can be in harmony with one another.